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Abstract
The research herein explores the correlation between performance and shareholder
concentration. This paper compares the performance of a group of companies with a single
shareholder stake of over 10% from the universe of the S&P 400 Midcap Index to the
performance of the index itself over a period of eight years (January 1, 2009 to January 1, 2016).
When run as a simulated portfolio, the group selected generated a slight amount of positive
alpha, but the results were ultimately statistically insignificant.
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Introduction
Around the Northwest Arkansas area, one need not look far to stumble across a number
of highly successful businesses. In a hundred mile radius of the University of Arkansas, one
finds the headquarters of J.B. Hunt, Tyson, and Walmart. Three vastly different companies
spanning a variety of industries. From retail to transportation, these highly varied businesses all
have one peculiar trait in common: they are “family-owned” enterprises. All three of the
founding families (although not necessarily the founders themselves at this point) still maintain
significant ownership stakes in the firms. The abnormality of the shareholder concentration and
the performance of such firms provided an impetus for this research.
It is precisely that phenomenon which this paper aims to explore. The question addressed
herein is whether or not shareholder concentration correlates to stock price outperformance in
midcap companies. Specifically, this analysis utilizes the S&P 400 Midcap Index as its universe
of securities to benchmark the performance of 36 companies meeting the proper shareholder
parameters from January 1, 2009 through January 1, 2016.

Methodology & Analysis
Timeframe:
The logic behind the window of time explored herein is as follows: the 2009-2016
timeframe was chosen in an attempt to avoid most of the highly negative effects of the financial
crisis on general share prices. With the uncharacteristic nature of a so-called “Black Swan” event
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skewing traditional fundamentals, it made the post-crisis era a more constructive period for
examination.
Selection Criteria
Within the chosen universe (the S&P 400 Midcap Index), the companies of which the
alternative examined portfolio was comprised were selected according to a number of criteria.
First, of the 403 companies comprising the index, 336 were eliminated for not meeting a floor
requirement of a single portfolio’s holding at least 10% of the outstanding equity. It is important
to note that “single portfolio” was a parameter so as to eliminate the holdings of many passive
money managing entities such as Fidelity, Vanguard, etc. that may have collectively exceeded
the floor in their holdings (which would typically be a collection of a plethora of index-tracking,
individual portfolios with small single positions). Second, of the 67 remaining companies with a
current single shareholder exceeding 10%, 29 were eliminated due to the shareholders’ not
having exceeded the floor for the course of the timeframe of interest. This step allowed for the
elimination of such shareholders who had built up a 10% stake over the course of the window or
whose holdings had fluctuated below said limit. This left the 36 companies seen below (figure
1).
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% Stake
Shareholder
49.14 RFPS Management Co.
38.28 Liberty Media Corp.
35.01 Gazit Entities
34.04 Joseph George
29.36 Clarence L. Werner
28.50 Ellen R. Gordon
27.71 John N. Kapoor
25.72 Hagedorn Partnership
21.61 Dareth A. Gerlach
20.40 William Robert Berkley
19.88 JMAC Inc.
19.81 Dai Ichi Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
19.79 Biglari Capital LLC
18.41 R. Philip Silver
17.88 Mubadala Development Co.
16.60 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
16.52 James W. Cabela
16.30 Singleton Group LLC
15.61 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
15.18 Trian Fund Management LP
15.14 Hyatt J. Brown
15.05 Southeastern Asset Management Inc.
14.49 Valentin Gapontsev Trust
14.02 Paul Marciano
13.98 Silver Star Development Ltd.
13.35 Crane Fund
13.33 Cventures Inc.
12.40 Carlos Slim Helu
11.33 Alice N. Schwartz
11.12 Longdon Co. of Virginia
11.00 Primecap Management Co.
10.90 Carl H Lindner III
10.73 John T. Ryan III
10.42 Thomas A. James
10.24 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
10.04 Atlanta Capital Management Co.

Ticker
ROL
HSNI
EQY
MCY
WERN
TR
AKRX
SMG
LANC
WRB
WOR
JNS
CBRL
SLGN
AMD
HNI
CAB
KMPR
GMT
WEN
BRO
GHC
IPGP
GES
SNX
CR
MDC
NYT
BIO
NEU
PLT
AFG
MSA
RJF
ATR
FICO

Original Group
Name
Rollins Inc
HSN Inc
Equity One Inc
Mercury General Corp
Werner Enterprises Inc
Tootsie Roll Industries Inc
Akorn Inc
Scotts Miracle-Gro Co/The
Lancaster Colony Corp
WR Berkley Corp
Worthington Industries Inc
Janus Capital Group Inc
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc
Silgan Holdings Inc
Advanced Micro Devices Inc
HNI Corp
Cabela's Inc
Kemper Corp
GATX Corp
Wendy's Co/The
Brown & Brown Inc
Graham Holdings Co
IPG Photonics Corp
Guess? Inc
SYNNEX Corp
Crane Co
MDC Holdings Inc
New York Times Co/The
Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc
NewMarket Corp
Plantronics Inc
American Financial Group Inc/OH
MSA Safety Inc
Raymond James Financial Inc
AptarGroup Inc
Fair Isaac Corp

Position size as of April 24, 2016

Sector
Consumer, Non-cyclical
Consumer, Cyclical
Financial
Financial
Industrial
Consumer, Non-cyclical
Consumer, Non-cyclical
Consumer, Cyclical
Consumer, Non-cyclical
Financial
Basic Materials
Financial
Consumer, Cyclical
Industrial
Technology
Consumer, Cyclical
Consumer, Cyclical
Financial
Industrial
Consumer, Cyclical
Financial
Consumer, Non-cyclical
Technology
Consumer, Cyclical
Technology
Industrial
Consumer, Cyclical
Communications
Consumer, Non-cyclical
Basic Materials
Communications
Financial
Industrial
Financial
Industrial
Technology

Industry Group
Commercial Services
Retail
REITS
Insurance
Transportation
Food
Pharmaceuticals
Housewares
Food
Insurance
Iron/Steel
Diversified Finan Services
Retail
Packaging & Containers
Semiconductors
Office Furnishings
Retail
Insurance
Trucking & Leasing
Retail
Insurance
Commercial Services
Semiconductors
Retail
Software
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Home Builders
Media
Biotechnology
Chemicals
Telecommunications
Insurance
Environmental Control
Diversified Finan Services
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Software

Figure 1
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Analysis:
Subsequently, the appropriate pricing data was pulled from Bloomberg for the various
companies and index (quoted as weekly closing price). From this, an equal-weighted portfolio of
the above equities was constructed by taking the week-to-week price performance (% change) of
each company, then aggregating these changes into a portfolio comprised of the above selected
firms. The same approach was taken for the index. This method was chosen so as to allow a
proper comparison of the two entities (as opposed to an average of price movements which
would possess similar inherent flaws to price-weighted indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial
Index). Granted, constructing an equal-weighted portfolio of the various companies does
inherently ignore a number of factors such as firm size. Such short-comings will be addressed in
the Confounding Variables & Biases segment of the paper.
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Following, two portfolios, imagined to have started at a base of $100, were run through
the various price change collections to produce the results seen below.

Comparative Returns
400
350

Price ($)

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1/2/2009

1/2/2010

1/2/2011

1/2/2012

1/2/2013

1/2/2014

1/2/2015

Date (Years)
S&P 400 Midcap Index

Concentrated Portfolio

Figure 2

Figure 2
A t-test and regression were then run on the data. The inputs and results are shown below.
t-test
S&P 400 Portfolio
Average Weekly Return
0.292%
0.372%
Weekly Std Deviation
2.71%
2.89%
Sharpe Ratio
0.090
0.112
Risk Free
0.0488%
T-Stat v. S&P 400
n
Beta
Alpha

0.525
365
1.030981
0.000719

Figure 3
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Note:


The Risk Free rate utilized was the average weekly yield of a U.S. Government 10-Year
Note over the period



N is the number of observations for the week-end pricing data within the period
examined
Regression

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.96868
R Square
0.93835
Adjusted R Square
0.93818
Standard Error
0.00718
Observations
365
df

Alternate Calculation (Double Check)
Beta
1.03098
Alpha
0.00072
Avg Week Portfolio
0.00372
Week Rf Rate
0.00049
Avg Week Mrkt
0.00292
SS
0.28483
0.01871
0.30354

MS
0.28483
0.00005

Intercept (Alpha)
Beta

Coefficients Standard Error
0.00072
0.00038
1.03098
0.01387

t Stat
1.90458
74.33075

Intercept (Alpha)
Beta

Lower 95%
-0.00002
1.00370

Regression
Residual
Total

1
363
364

F
Significance F
5525.06110 1.0198E-221

P-value
0.05762
0.00000

Upper 95%
Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
0.00146
-0.00002
0.00146
1.05826
1.00370
1.05826

Figure 4

Results:
This analysis brings to the fore a number of considerations. Examining Figure 2 provides
the reader with the initial impressions that firms with such concentrated shareholder bases tend to
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outperform the overall index within the given timeframe. From this though, one must then
consider the level of risk required to achieve the superior performance.
It is for this consideration that the t-test and Sharpe Ratios are most relevant. In
comparing the Sharpe Ratio of the S&P 400 Midcap Index (.090) to that of the alternate portfolio
(.112) that one is able to see that it does, in fact, outperform the given index on a risk-adjusted
basis. Unfortunately, one must then consider the results of the t-test. With a value of .525, the
results of the test are insignifant to make any conclusive claim. The answer that most readily
comes to mind for these findings seems to be that, although one may gain a superior riskadjusted performance (utilizing only Sharpe Ratio as one’s metric), the amount gained by way of
performance (.08% weekly) is very little more in terms of that which is shouldered by way of
increased exposure to variance (.18%).
Moving to the regression analysis of Figure 4, one is able to gain a more clear
understanding of the previously mentioned results. With an R Square value of .93835, it can be
inferred that around 93% of the variance in the concentrated portfolio’s returns can be explained
by changes in the overall market (which, in the case of this study is the S&P 400 Midcap Index).
Conversely, what is implied by the calculated alpha and beta values is that the outperformance
generated by said portfolio is extremely small (Alpha = .00072) and that the collection of
companies with concentrated shareholder bases ultimately moves very similarly to the index
itself (Beta = 1.03098).
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Confounding Variables & Biases:
It should be noted that there are a number of external factors that could drive the results
found herein. As was mentioned earlier, the study’s portfolio operates under the structure of an
equal-weighted portfolio. This was the most effective way to perform the analysis of the piece,
but is a short-coming in as far as accounting for firm size is concerned.
Furthermore, one must also consider the varying degrees to which the positions are
concentrated as well as the variety of motives behind said positions. A prime example of such
differences can be found in examining the positions of Thomas A. James and Trian Fund
Management LP. In the case of Thomas A. James’s position in Raymond James Financial Inc.,
that is more similar to the various companies discussed in the introduction (“family-owned”
enterprises). This can be compared to the motives behind Trian Fund Management’s positions in
The Wendy’s Company. Trian, although having a similarly vested interest in their company’s
performance as James, is a noted activist investor. This is important in that the strategies
undertaken by an activist investor to drive value within a firm are often very different from those
that dictate the thought-process of legacy and family shareholders (often long- v. short-term
approaches). It is challenging to draw such a simple connection as suggesting that a larger,
single vested interest in a company’s performance will correlate to overall performance with so
many variables at play, but the purpose of this study in itself was simply to examine the
relationship between the two, not to expansively answer such other questions as what drives the
relationship itself (should it have existed more strongly).
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One must also note that this research failed to perform out of sample testing. The
portfolio tracked is constructed utilizing information beyond the scope of that which was
available to shareholders at its time of incipience, and was not rebalanced over the course of the
study. Hence, the results obtained herein would require more refinement and testing to construct
an effective trading strategy.
Finally, the benchmark used for the study was the stated price performance of the S&P
400 Midcap Index at face value. This could be problematic in that the actual composition of the
index over time is subject to change (a factor for which this study did not take account). Hence,
this introduces aspects of survivorship bias to the analysis in that companies moving in and out
of the index pool were largely ignored.

Conclusion
Although the constructed index provides promising levels of performance, the statistical
insignificance suggests that far more research is necessary. Possible alternatives in approach
could take into account the size of the various shareholder positions as a percentage of overall
outstanding equity or perhaps the size of the firms themselves. Interestingly, many of the
companies meeting the shareholder criteria came from the consumer sector of the index. In line
with the discussion of Walmart in the introduction, one could also possibility of this
relationship’s existing in such sectors as Consumer Staples or Consumer Discretionary.
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Ultimately, the findings of the study are statistically insignificant for the time period
examined. Although this was the case, the relationship seen through the slight generation of
alpha still provides a promising point of interest for further exploration.
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